Introduction
Early on the morning of 24 October 1985 Michael Brown, chief executive of the London Metal Exchange, was sitting in his office chatting to the chairman of the exchange's committee, Ted Jordan. The telephone range. It was Pieter de Koning, the International Tin Council's buffer stock manager and the most powerful person in the world tin market. There was a brief conversation. Brown recalls: 'I turned to Ted and said "de Koning has suspended trading". ' In that instant both realised that chaos threatened.
Their immediate concern was the LME and its members. They knew that around half of the LME's 27 ring dealing members' were heavily involved with the buffer stock. They also suspected that de Koning's careful word 'suspend' was code for defaulting on his outstanding positions with those firms. There could only be one reason for the buffer stock withdrawing from the market: incredible as it might seem, a body backed by 22 sovereign states had run out of money. Tin was the least traded of the LME's seven metals, but it was immediately obvious that a big default would damage the reputation of the exchange and perhaps of the City of London as an international centre for commodity trading. After a quick consultation with Jacques Lion, the chairman of the LME board, trading in the tin contract was stopped.
By suspending trading the exchange locked itself and its members into the most serious crisis to afflict commodity trading for half a century, from which neither it nor its members has recovered. Worse from its standpoint, the LME became an increasingly LME membership is divided into two main categories: 22 active ring dealing members and 63 non-ring dealing members. There are also 36 individual subscribers and 12 honorary members. Ring dealing members, who numbered 27 when the crisis broke, are firms allowed to deal directly on the floor or 'ring' of the exchange. Non-ring dealing members may deal directly with other exchange members but have to put ring dealing business through ring dealing members. All the ring dealing members are owned by bigger companies. IDS BuI!vun, 1986 , vol t7 no4, tnstitute of Development Studms, Sussex 34 unimportant part of an international dispute which it only dimly understood. The field was quickly dominated by national governments, big banks, and in the background the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. For the LME the issues were the sanctity of contract and the preservation of the exchange. But for the other participants it was a matter of realpolitik, in which the stakes were the future of international commodity agreements, the debt crisis, and relations between developing commodity producing countries and industrial consumers of commodities. What originated as a commercial dispute -the announcement by the ITC that it could not pay its debts -rapidly intensified and expanded into a test case of the ability of commodity agreements to survive in adverse market conditions. The ITC seems to have failed the
test.
For what nobody -except perhaps a few ITC officials -could have known that morning was what the technical suspension of the buffer stock's trading would reveal. Least of all did they anticipate a six month crisis, at the end of which the ITC's members2 -which included all the then members of the European Community -would refuse to honour fully debts of9OO mn. As legal actions against the ITC and member countries, including Britain, now accumulate, we can begin to count the cost of the loss of public faith in commodity agreements. Has the ITC's pleading diplomatic immunity as the reason for not paying its debts undermined well-intentioned efforts to introduce some order into commodity trading and prices, and if so by how much? The Background
In fact, relations between the LME as the main free market price-setting mechanism for tin and the ITC and some of its more prominent members, notably forward commitments to sell tin did not have to pay to the mysterious holder of tin a monopoly price for the metal they needed to fulfill their contracts. The heat was taken out of the market and within a fortnight the three-months price had fallen by almost £2,000 a tonne. But the LME was bitterly attacked by senior Malaysian politicians.
In retrospect, moreover, the affair sowed the seeds of the much bigger disaster which was to follow four years later. Publicly it highlighted the tension between an exchange founded a century ago at the height of laissez-faire and still run as a cross between a gentleman's club and a bazaar, and a post-war intergovernmental body founded on the principle of regulating the consequences of supply and demand. Mistrust and misunderstanding was to be expected, yet the two organisations had coexisted for 30 years and had even come to depend on each other.
Privately, behind the closed doors of the ITC, it widened the gap between consumer and producer members and even caused some producers such as 
The Fall in Tin Consumption
The net effect of all these factors has been a steady fall in tin consumption for more than a decade. Japan's entry into the war and the loss of tin supplies from Asia seemed to justify the American decision to build up a tin stockpile. But it was to prove part of the ITA's undoing.
That, however, was still a long way off. In the years just after the war the Asian mines were quickly rehabilitated and by 1948 production was already exceeding consumption. In 1950 the producers agreed at a UN conference on tin that production cuts were necessary. The United States opposed cuts, however, because it was still buying tin and feared a shortage. In the event, the Korean War stimulated a new boom.
The First International Tin Agreement and its Successors
A second UN conference, in 1973, was more fruitful.
The Korean war had ended and the United States, having accumulated a tin mountain of 40,000 tonnes more than the original target, was in a more cooperative mood. The outcome of the conference was the First International Tin Agreement, which came into force on 1 July 1956. From the start the ITA looked strong. It included all the major western tin producers and consumers, brought together in the more optimistic and liberal atmosphere which then prevailed. It incorporated a target price range to be defended by both a buffer stock and production or export quotas, and also boasted the enlightened feature of giving the producer and consumer groups, into which it was divided, equal votes. inhibit its earnings of desperately needed hard currency, also refused to join. Malaysia was both pushing for a higher intervention price and trying to start a cartel of producers without consumers in the belief that direct dealing with consumers bypassing the LME would keep prices higher. Everything was overshadowed by the LME manipulation and by the parlous financial condition of the buffer stock, which was nevertheless obliged to buy some 50,000 tonnes of tin unloaded by the failed market operators. This tin formed the basis of the Sixth ITA buffer stock.
Attempts by the producers to raise the buffer stock intervention range were successfully resisted by consumers who argued that in the current oversupplied market tin was too expensive, even though prices had fallen to their lowest for five years in the wake of the LME fiasco. In a fateful move it was also agreed to allow the buffer stock manager to borrow commercially against the security of his stocks. Eventually a cliffhanging meeting in Geneva under the auspices of UNCTAD agreed to bring the Sixth ITA into operation without the required number of votes.
It was not an auspicious start. Within days the ITC agreed to impose a 36 per cent cut in tin exports. Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand announced that they would form an Association of Tin Producing
Countries, although stressing that the ATPC was not meant to be a 'tinpec'. There was dissension between the majority among the EEC consumers and Britain and Germany who were suspicious of Malaysia's role in the LME manipulation and wanted guarantees that the ITC would not abuse its market position.
The Sixth ITA might nevertheless have worked had it not been for three crucial factors: very low world demand for tin, a rapid increase in production by countries outside the ITA coupled with smuggling from ITC producers, and adverse currency movements. Weakening prices tempted speculators to sell tin short -to sell tin they did not own in the hope that by the time the contracts fell due the price would have fallen below the contract price. The buffer stock executed a devastating squeeze on the market at the end of June by insisting that traders who had agreed three months earlier to sell to it should provide metal, not cash. But the only source of so much spot tin was the ITC itself.
The old animosity between the LME and the ITC flared up again as the LME limited the backwardation which developed. The public row which ensued between de Koning and the LME authorities was reminiscent of 1982.
Not that de Koning had lacked ingenuity. As tne later audit of the ITC by the accountants Peat Marwick Mitchell showed, the buffer stock had entered into a complex web of deals with metal brokers, mainly on the LME. In essence these arrangements enabled the buffer stock to stretch its already thin finances, with the incidental advantage of disguising how thin they were, and take on more tin that would otherwise have been possible. One device was to borrow money from brokers to buy more tin, often from the same brokers who lent the money. Another was to 'borrow' tin in such a way that the buffers stock paid only interest and a premium rather than the full cost of outright purchase. Several LME brokers were only too happy to do business with the ITC. Metal markets generally were depressed, and at the very high prices prevailing in mid-1985 the buffer stock was just about the only buyer. After all, was it not backed by 22 sovereign states?
But however ingenious his defence of the price, the buffer stock manager's position was fatally undermined by the relentless fall in London prices which prompted margin calls from his brokers and calls for more collateral from his bankers. As early as March the ITC support operation had lost £20 mn. In
September the ATPC pledged £60 mn to the buffer stock. Most of the money never arrived, although it might have sustained the operation for another six months. Squeezed in this pincer the ITC buffer stock simply ran out of money on the morning of 24 October.
The Default
What happened thereafter has been well chronicled in the press.4 After months of frustrating prevarications during which tin trading virtually stopped because nobody could be sure of the price, the ITC failed to agree on how to refinance its debts of £900 mn. The failure of 22 countries, several of them rich nations prone to lecturing the Third World on financial probity, was all the more extraordinary given the desperation of creditor banks and brokers to settle. The plan which eventually emerged by January 1986 was that a company -first called Newco and later Tinco -would be set up to take on all the ITC's 80,000 tonnes of tin. Tinco would be capitalised with £200 mn subscribed in equal measure by ITC consumer and producer members, £70 mn from the banks and brokers, and £50 mn of loan capital from the British government. In return the ITC would be freed of all obligations and Tinco would oversee an orderly disposal of the tin. By the end of the haggling in early March the creditors had agreed to increase their share to at least £100 mn, with a corresponding reduction in the ITC's share of Tinco's capitalisation. Even that 'burden sharing' was not enough.
The ITC's Debts
Two aspects of the default -probably the biggest in commercial history -deserve attention: the details of what the ITC owed, and why the default occurred.
On 24 October the ITC held 52,540 tonnes of physical tin. If all pending transactions had been completed, the buffer stock's net holding would have been 49,590 tonnes (worth £400 mn at the suspension price). The frightening aspect of the figures, however, was that the buffer stock would have incurred by the end of January debts of £900 mn, of which £281 mn would have been to 14 creditor banks and the rest to metal traders. With the value of its collateral falling continuously, there was no way these debts could have been met, except by the members subscribing more funds to the council. The LME settlement of March at a set price of £6,250 a tonne left the ITC owing metal brokers £180 mn.
The Debtors' Motives The argument put forward unofficially by several members, notably Germany, France and the Netherlands, was that the council enjoyed diplomatic immunity: it could not be prosecuted for its debts.
Indeed, one remarkable discovery in the ITA was that it contained no provision for bankruptcy, an optimistic piece of drafting for which UNCTAD must assume some responsibility. Legal opinion differs on the degree of immunity the ITC enjoys and certainly the British government has been advised that the immunity is not watertight. As brokers bring actions against tite ITC and its members this will be tested.
But whether or not the lTG enjoys diplomatic immunity begs the question of why members chose to hide behind it. The more charitable explanation is that the customary working method of the lTG made agreement difficult to reach. The usual procedure was to discuss business until a consensus emerged. It was a method plainly ill-suited to a crisis, especially one which appears to have caught many members unawares. The argument made by some European countries that this was a British crisis and that the main interest of the British government was to protect the LME was probably little more than an excuse.
Whatever the ITC's mechanisms, and whatever members knew about what was going on, there was considerable reluctance from the outset to meet the debts. Significantly, the lTG did not say immediately We will honour all obligations freely entered into' and then work out how to do it. To the author, who covered the crisis as a reporter from beginning to end, there was from a very early stage the smell of default in the air. Yet one suspended judgement simply because the very idea of so big a default by such debtors was almost unthinkable.
One factor which made it so, apart from straightforward commercial considerations, was that only three years earlier these same countries had solemnly brought the Sixth ITA into being. France and the Netherlands, had even made special contributions to smooth the path. What had changed?
One major change between 1982 and 1985 was a hardening of government attitudes towards community pacts as all raw material prices fell, led by OPEC, and the decline into ineffectiveness if not disuse of most commodity agreements (coffee perhaps being the exception). The other important change was specific to tin. Tin stocks mounted and the market was continuously oversupplied yet prices rose. An agreement unable to maintain sensible prices could not properly serve the interests of producer or consumer.
The impression of a lapse of attention if not downright negligence on the part of ITC members is reinforced by their reactions to the audit. A swift reaction was to accuse the buffer stock manager of trading beyond his remit. But it was the responsibility of the members to peruse this vital part of the agreement. In its reply to the Select Committee on Trade and Industry, which was highly critical of the British government's role in the crisis, the government claimed that its delegates reported fully the situation in the lTG and that warnings of possible financial problems were transmitted to the City via the Bank of England.6 It is understood, however, that the delegate's reports were First, the root of members' disenchantment with the ITA was its meretricious success in keeping tin prices high. In 1984 copper and lead prices measured in US cents per pound were only 60 per cent higher than the corresponding averages for 1956. Zinc and aluminium were three times higher. But tin was six times higher [Roskill 1985:1] . Why the consumer members of the LTG agreed to support such unrealistic prices is a very important question for future commodity agreements. The lesson is that to succeed a commodity agreement with economic (i.e. pricing) clauses must pitch its intervention range reasonably in line with the market.
Surviving and meeting members' needs are better served by aiming for price stability and a predictable income than by forcing prices up.
Second, when the ITC started life it was a cartel with the unusual feature of consumer members. But high prices inevitably attracted other producers into the market while also promoting consumers to ask whether the agreement was in their interest. A corollary is that as more developing countries exploit their natural resources, commodity agreements of all kinds will require so many members to be effective as to be unwieldy. The coffee agreement, for example, has difficulty policing all its members. The lesson is that few agreements are likely to be comprehensive enough to last long.
And third, it may be that as developing countries diversify their economies, the need for commodity agreements will diminish. When Malaysia helped set up the ITC, tin accounted for almost a quarter of its exports by value. 
